The difference constitutions make: a global inquiry into the impacts of institutional design

This dissertation provides an international perspective on the problem of constitutional engineering. At its heart it is an assessment of the direction and magnitude of constitutional effects on the quality and robustness of government, taken from two major constitutional paradigms: that of constitutional regime types and that of inclusive-versus-exclusive democratic competitiveness. Constitutional performance is evaluated in terms of effects on measurements of governance across dimensions such as rule of law, social welfare and fiscal management, which are measured based on citizen perceptions and other aggregates. The analysis moves in four stages. First, an analysis of regime types treated endogenously. Second, an estimation of regime type effects on three dimensions of good governance. This is proceeded by another estimation exercise, this time on the regime type effects on fiscal management. Finally, there is an assessment of the social welfare effects of power-sharing institutions. I find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that alloy constitutional models attenuate the effects of presidentialism and parliamentarism. The presidential system is also found to perform well with respect to fiscal management. Power-sharing institutions generally have positive effects on social welfare but these remarks must be qualified by the extent to which power-sharing institutions tend toward rent-seeking and inefficiency, and by the extent to which under stronger controls, related to making national aggregates more commensurable, this evidence appears to dissolve